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Abstract
Trade and consumption of food in the Sino-Japanese context connects the two
countries’ tense political relationship to the everyday lives of its citizens. Previous
research has shown how food-related incidents have imbued Sino-Japanese relations
with political and moral discourse that connects security concerns to everyday fears.
This article explores how young Chinese people in Japan navigate multiple moral
economies related to food. Through analysis of “products” (chanpin/shipin) and “cui-
sine” (cai/liaoli), this article shows the differing meanings of Chinese moral economies of
food from the perspective of young Chinese people living in Japan. In the Sino-Japanese
context, products embody more metonymic and nationalised values associated with
modernity, whereas the metaphoric possibilities of cuisine afford young Chinese people
to negotiate dominant moral economies of food in Japan. Using this example, I argue
that greater semiotic attention needs to be paid to the multiple meanings of food and its
moral economies.
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Introduction
Chinese moralities and economies of food extend beyond the boundaries of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Today, there are few places that are not touched by China’s role
in global food systems, from the impact of China’s demand for palm oil (Schouten and
Glasbergen, 2011) and luxury seafood (Fabinyi, 2012), to the frozen produce and rice that
China exports to neighbouring countries (Zhou, 2017). The circulation and mobilisation of
food in the PRC entangles communities around the world, particularly those who live in
China’s major food trading partner countries, such as Japan. China’s largest food export
partner is Japan, amounting to over 5.5 billion US dollars in 2015 (WITS, 2016). Japan is
also highly dependent on food imports (Nagata, 2008) receiving consumable processed
commodities more so than raw produce. From noodles, cheap soy sauce and snacks to the
frozen meals bought in Japanese supermarkets, Chinese products are a significant part of
everyday life in Japan. In 2015, more than 61 per cent of Japan’s food was imported,
making it the largest importer of food in the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) (Japanese Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Wheat products, preserved
vegetables and frozen products (a significant part of the Japanese diet) mostly come from
China (MAFF, 2017). Japan’s dependence on food imports exposes it to a range of
uncertainties and risks that impact on its relationship with its neighbours (Hook et al.,
2015). From food contamination scandals to mass purchasing of Japanese consumables,
Sino-Japanese food mobilities have spurred moral panics in Japan over the past decade.
Food mobilities intersect with human mobilities and media flows in entangled ways
between China and Japan. In this context of growing migration, tourism, media, and trade,
food takes on pertinent geopolitical meanings. Alongside food mobilities, human mobility
between China and Japan is on the rise. As of 2017, there were over 690,000 registered
Chinese nationals living in Japan, making them the largest non-Japanese minority in the
country (Ministry of Justice, Japan, 2017). A significant majority of this population are
recent migrants, having grown from some 45,000 in 1985 to current figures today. There
are also a growing number of permanent residents, naturalised citizens, and people of
Taiwanese heritage who, since 2012, have been recorded as a separate population. As Liu-
Farrer (2011) has shown, a significant number of these newcomers first arrived in Japan on
educationally channelled visas such as study visas and trainee programmes, which served
as a proxy labour migration scheme in Japan from the 1990s onwards. Today many of
these students have found work or started businesses in Japan since first studying there,
attracting relatives to Japan through kin-based “chain migration” (Brettell, 2003).
Alongside these migration patterns, favourable exchange rates between the yen and the
RMB, has seen a boom in trade and tourism between China and Japan (Bofulin and
Coates, 2017). Scouting for “explosive shopping” (爆買い, bakugai) opportunities, and the
purchasing of consumable products for gifting and re-sale (代购, daigou) has become a
significant source of revenue for many young Chinese people in Japan.
The multiple intersecting mobilities found within this context and their relationship to
consumption, morals, and economic concerns invoke several challenges to how we think
about moral economies more broadly. Within this article, I combine ethnographic
observations among young Chinese people in Japan with broader analysis of the Sino-
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Japanese context to argue that greater semiotic attention needs to be applied to dis-
cussions of moral economies in East Asia. My argument is primarily theoretical and
follows the call for more East Asia specialists to use Asia as a method for theoretical
inquiry (Chen, 2010). To provide an example of what this greater semiotic attention
might look like, I draw inspiration from the emic distinction between two differing
domains of “food-talk” in the Sino-Japanese context to show how we might trace what
Fassin (2009) calls “the double topography” of moral economies.
The data I use in this article are not from a dedicated study about food but come
from a wider study of media-use and political identities among young Chinese people
in Japan. Nonetheless, I was struck by how often the interviews and observations in
this wider study turned to conversations about food. I compare my participants’ tes-
timonies and observed practices with wider media debates about food mobilities
between China and Japan. Comparing these differing examples, I show how the dis-
tinction between discourses of food as both “products” and “cuisine” in everyday Sino-
Japanese contexts suggests that the moralities of food economies can be discussed in
multiple ways.
I conducted two periods of fieldwork (2009–2011 and 2014–2016) among young
Chinese people in Japan, with a particular focus on the neighbourhood of Ikebukuro
in Northwest Tokyo. Ikebukuro is the second busiest train station in Tokyo (after
Shinjuku) and has become a major hub for Chinese migrant sociality in Tokyo.
During my fieldwork, there were over 300 Chinese-owned shops in the western side
of Ikebukuro station, and around 11,000 Chinese residents, with an additional inflow
of Chinese people who live in areas that connect to this bustling station. The con-
centration of Chinese food and Chinese commercial activity has seen Ikebukuro’s
western quarter unofficially dubbed a “Chinatown” (Yamashita, 2010) despite some
resistance from the local government and disagreements among Ikebukuro’s Chinese
residents. It is nonetheless a hub for Chinese food mobilities in Tokyo, and an
excellent site to explore how young Chinese people contend with the daily conse-
quences of tense Sino-Japanese relations and poor media portrayals of migrants in
Japan (Coates, 2013, 2015).
The networks of roughly 300 people I conducted participant-observation with were
under forty-five years old Chinese urbanites who played, worked or lived in Ikebukuro.
Less than a third of my cohort were students at the time, but most had previously come
to Japan on student visas before transitioning to work and other entrepreneurial activi-
ties. Despite all being under forty-five, it should not be assumed that this cohort were
only “newcomers” to the Japanese context. Indeed, the term “newcomer” in Japanese is
only used by the oldest in this cohort who had lived in Japan for up to fifteen years,
worked in a variety of Chinese-owned and Japanese-owned businesses, had permanent
residency, and had started to have young children. The majority of the youngest had
lived in Japan for at least two years, with three young individuals who were born in
Japan and had resided there on and off for twenty years. Most were not from wealthy
backgrounds but earned enough to travel within Japan and experience a variety of
cuisines. A few key figures within these networks had become very wealthy over their
time in Japan and associated with networks of elite Chinese who rarely came to
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Ikebukuro. Perhaps due to their rapid social mobility, these people tended to fall in and
out with these other networks, suggesting the social boundaries between those who
frequent Ikebukuro, and those who do not.
I use the term “young Chinese people” as an imperfect shorthand to describe this
diverse network of people. Despite the limits of my sample, the people I met serve as a
cross section of several important and emergent groups that live transnational lives
between China and Japan. I managed to speak to many kinds of Chinese nationals living
in Japan, from the wealthy to the poor, and a variety of ethnic backgrounds from Han
and Li, to Inner-Mongolian and Uyghur. Despite this diversity, they were all sampled
from networks that intermingle in Sinophone social spaces in Ikebukuro. My place-
based sampling method, rather than a focus on sociological demographic criteria, sug-
gests that we need to look beyond understandings of Chinese migration to Japan that
depend on fixed ethnic identities and established migrant communities. In particular, we
need to move beyond understanding Chinese migration to Japan as being a pre-
dominantly, multigenerational Chinese-identifying minority in Japan who lead lives very
much separated from the more recent majority of people from mainland China.
My participants were not merely a reflection of “Chinese” perspectives about the
moral economies of food in Japan but rather stood as an emergent Sino-Japanese group
that filter different understandings of wider Japanese and Chinese frameworks of moral
economy. In this sense, the ethnographic descriptions and contextualising information
that follows should be understood as a reflection of fieldwork with young Chinese
people in Japan, rather than Japanese perceptions of Chinese food or Chinese percep-
tions of food. The meanings generated by this group of people serve as an important site
of mediation between China and Japan and are likely to inform the identities and
imaginaries of new communities between China and Japan in the near future.
Mediating Moral Economies of Food in the Sino-Japanese
Context
Thompson (1971) originally coined the term moral economy while describing riots in
eighteenth-century Britain as people faced spasmodic increases in the cost of food during
a time where their livelihoods were simultaneously being dismantled (see this issue’s
Introduction). These riots were not only a response to the perceived injustices sur-
rounding everyday people’s access to food but also a response to inequitable changes in
the moral outlook of the economy as Britain entered capitalist modernity. Thompson’s
account of these events also showed the methodological utility of investigating moments
where efforts to address perceived injustices and hypocrisy, reveal something of the
logics of moral orders in a given time and place. As noted in the introduction to this
special issue, outrage at the contradictions, exceptions, and unreliable nature of food in
China today helps us trace the contours of contemporary Chinese moralities.
In December 2013, a Japanese worker in the Aqlifoods subsidiary Maruha Nichiro
Holdings Inc. used pesticides to poison a range of frozen foods resulting in the poisoning
of over 300 people (Japan Times, 2014; Walraven, 2017). Although the man was
arrested for poisoning the produce, the general discourse surrounding the issue related to
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questions of mental health and unfair labour conditions for Japanese factory workers.
This event caused a stir among several of the young Chinese people I was researching in
2014 because of the way it contrasted with how a similar case was handled years earlier.
As a young man from Dalian who had lived in Japan for 10 years reminded me it was
not long before then in 2008 that an incident involving poisoned dumplings (餃子,
gyoza) from China occurred. Comparing the two incidents, my informant recounted how
the two poisoning events left many young Chinese people living in Japan with a sense of
frustration about the bias and hypocrisy surrounding the different portrayals of the two
incidents.
Right here in Japan, exactly the same thing occurred! It was also a worker in a frozen foods
factory, and the Japanese one also used pesticides and then he was caught. After that, the
Japanese media presented the whole issue in a totally different light to how the poison
dumpling incident was represented back then. There was no line of thinking like the ‘poison
dumpling’ scandal, nor was there any major shift in how people thought about frozen foods.
But more importantly, there was no concern about the quality of Japanese produced frozen
food. It feels a bit like a double standard. (Anonymous 1, 2015)
The incident my interlocutor was referring to started in 2007, when after a series of
disputes with his employer, a worker in the Hebei Tianyang food factory sabotaged a
batch of frozen dumplings by injecting them with pesticides. Some of these dumplings
were subsequently exported to Japan, and roughly ten people fell ill from their con-
sumption in 2008, although reports are difficult to verify due to the sensationalist
coverage of the topic (Rosenberger, 2009; Walravens, 2017). The nationalistic governor
of Tokyo at the time, Ishihara Shintaro, likened the incident to the 9/11 attacks in the
United States and the London bombing (Ishihara, 2008), the term “food terror” prolif-
erated in various media platforms reflecting much of the tone surrounding everyday
transnational relations between China and Japan over the past decade. In the end, the
man accused of poisoning the dumplings, Lu Yueting, was sentenced to life imprison-
ment, tense public sentiment in both Japan and China likely fuelling an overzealous
verdict (BBC News, 2014). As both my interlocutor and Walravens (2017) noted, there
was a disproportionate response to these two incidents of contamination. According to
Walravens’ analysis, for example, the Japanese newspapers Asahi and Yomiuri covered
the Chinese case more than three times the amount the Aqli foods case was covered
(Walraven, 2017: 274).
Food contaminated with poisonous chemicals is a real concern in China as much as
Japan. Yet, as Walravens (2017) has observed despite a numeric decline in the number of
food safety violations from Chinese importers, Chinese food has become an increasing
object of concern within Japanese public discourse. As she notes, the concern about
Chinese foodstuffs connects to wider concerns about impurity, violence, and geopolitics,
telling us much about the discursive framing of Chineseness in the Japanese context. A
concern with the food of “Others” has grown into a small genre of sensationalist
reporting in conservative magazines in Japan. For example, Shūkan Bunshun (週刊文
集) has an ongoing segment titled “overly dangerous Chinese produce!” (危険すぎる中
国産食品, kiken sugiru chūgokusan shokuhin) (Tokuyama, 2017) which has also been
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published as a compendium called “Scary China Food, Creepy American Food” (Okuno
and Tokuyama, 2017). At the time of writing in 2018, there were also debates on various
Japanese social media about the safety of Chinese produced unagi (鰻) eel, a popular
dish consumed in the hot Japanese summer. These debates were spurred by an inter-
national crackdown on Chinese smugglers. In particular, a case of smuggling glass eels
between Spanish, Portuguese, and Chinese farms before exporting them to Japan had
diminished public trust (SCMP, 2018). The media coverage acted as an anxious reminder
of Japan’s dependence on Chinese farmers for food perceived as quintessentially
“Japanese” such as unagi. In this case, there was no incident of contamination, but
questions of food dependence and mobility nonetheless raised anxieties in Japanese
social media circles.
Incidents such as these remind us how the geographic or symbolic movement can
symbolically contaminate food as much as the literal contamination of food product.
Scholars such as Douglas have shown how that which moves between pre-established
classifications, or “matter out of place,” is seen as unclean and/or imbued with signif-
icant power (Douglas, 2002: 36). From the sacred to the dangerous, contamination
across classificatory boundaries sparks both fear and awe. To find potentially edible
things that are not considered food in one’s meal inspires disgust. Yet, in other places or
circumstances those same edible things may be considered food. These classical dis-
cussions of food suggest the powerful role classificatory schemes play in how “food” is
experienced, and the potentially disruptive effects of movement between these classi-
fications. Extrapolated to food relations between places and cultures, particularly
between industrialised and post-industrialised settings, it is easy to imagine why the food
of the “Other” is a source of anxiety, and increasingly becomes associated with concerns
about contamination. In the Sino-Japanese context then, the contaminated and the
supposedly “out of place” form a cycle of anxieties about the moral economies of food
mobilities and the “Other.”
Concerns about food mobilities and contamination map onto everyday life and are
part of Tokyo’s streets as much as its media. For example, many Japanese restaurants
make sure to list exactly where they source their cheap produce at the entrance to their
establishment. This practice indicates the ways different produce becomes imbued with
affective and moral associations. The use of “safe” Australian and New Zealand meat
products is proudly announced, although produce associated with a Japanese locality is
still touted as best, such as beef from Hida in Gifu or locally sourced Miso paste. While
the ubiquity of “Japaneseness” as guaranteeing safety has been thrown into question
after 3/11, several media campaigns, politicians and NGOs have attempted to restore
faith in produce from the area, such as the group “Fukushima Farmers and Supporters
Unite!” (がんばろう福島、農業者等の会, ganbaro Fukushima nōgyoshato no kai)
(JNPOC.ne.jp, 2016; Rosenberger, 2016). Chinese produce, in contrast, is typically
framed in the negative, where restaurants and grocers state specifically that they “do not
use Chinese produce” (中国産食品, chūgokusan shokuhin).
The wider media-influenced context of Sino-Japanese discussions of food show how
economies of food have multiple moral interpretations that relate to different political
imperatives. The frustrations of the young Chinese people I spoke to perhaps pale in
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comparison to the sentiments of starving eighteenth-century rioters, or indeed the threat
of food contamination in China today. Yet, they tell us something about how talking
about food frames the way moral economies of food are understood. My Chinese
interlocutors, such as the one quoted above, did not express outrage over the inequitable
or unsafe distribution of food. Rather, they expressed frustration over the perceived
inequitable distribution of various forms of recognition. For Chinese people living in
Japan who contend with Japanese perceptions of Chineseness on a day-to-day level then,
we can infer that Japanese discourses surrounding Chinese food in Japan impact on their
sense of what it means to be Chinese in the world today. It is a frustrating time for many
young Chinese people who are living abroad, seeing the flaws in both their homes and
host destinations while often being bombarded with conflicting media messages about
China, Chinese people, and Chinese products.
Products and Cuisine
During my fieldwork in Japan, media stories such as those mentioned above often situated
food as representing the moral qualities of either China or Japan. Incidents relating to food
came to signify nations or the relationship between nations when reported in the media,
echoing Walravens’ observation that the public Japanese discourse surrounding
Sino-Japanese food mobilities often referred to the immorality of Chinese people and
institutions. Public discourses of Chinese food, and moral panics surrounding specific
incidents, would serve as a backdrop for quotidian negotiations of food among those I
workedwith.Whilemy participants, such as the person quoted previously were frustrated
by international discourses surrounding Chinese food, they also demonstrated other ways
of engaging in moral and economic quandaries related to Chinese food in Japan.
On one occasion, a businessman from Singapore had come to discuss a potential
business partnership with a Chinese importer in Ikebukuro. The Singaporean had spent
some time in Australia, and so my participants thought that I, an Anglo-Celtic Australian
who speaks Chinese, would serve as the perfect entertainer for the evening. The host was
from Dalian and had just returned from a trip home before hosting his guest. In the hope
of impressing the Singaporean businessman, he arranged to take us to a Chinese seafood
restaurant close to one of the major bar districts in Ikebukuro. As we entered the elevator
for the restaurant, he started to talk about the restaurant telling how this particular place
was very good because it used Japanese and Australian imports (Anonymous 2, 2016).
He described how the crabs were particularly good, having come from the north of
Japan. The phrase “Japanese crab” sparked a short play of words where the Singaporean
businessman made a joke about whether or not it is still a Japanese crab if it is prepared
in a Chinese dish, ending in him commenting that all seas meet each other in the end,
and that Chinese crabs are basically the same as Japanese ones, given the proximity of
the two countries. “It’s the same sea, but you never know where Chinese produce comes
from” replied my interlocutor in describing how he had just come back from Dalian but
does not eat seafood in China anymore. He continued that Japan was becoming one of
the best places to eat Chinese cuisine because you could have good Chinese chefs with
better ingredients.
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As my brief experience described above suggests, for many of the people I spoke to,
food was not merely one thing, but rather was discussed in various ways that often
played off the contradictions between different kinds of economic and social activity. In
particular, I observed two common domains of “food-talk” where “products” (产品/食
品, chanpin/shipin) and “cuisine” (菜/料理, cai/liaoli) were juxtaposed. Both terms are
related to different kinds of economic activity, from importing and exporting produce to
the preparation of specific dishes. As my interlocutor notes, they also relate to different
imaginaries, where there are contrasting discussions about where a foodstuff comes from
or is manufactured and how it is prepared for consumption. Within this context, food-
talk about “products” and trade in goods often acted as a metonym for a territory’s
modernity, because these references focused on a countries ability to provide safe,
reliable manufacturing. In contrast, cuisine was more commonly associated with meta-
phoric personal and ethno-cultural qualities, where a preference for the qualities of a
particular imagined cuisine are loosely interpreted “as if” the people associated with that
cuisine embodied those qualities. These linguistic framings of food act as a form of
imaginative practice (Appadurai, 1996) where processes of metaphor and metonymy
(Jakobson, 1956) come to stand for moral and affective qualities. They also suggest a
theoretical point that could be added to discussions of moral economies. While
Thompson (1971) and Scott (1977) focus on injustices in food distribution systems, and
moral outrage about food safety, they attend less to the ways food-in-itself (rather than
food economies) can be deemed “immoral” or come to represent certain moral qualities.
In his overview of the term moral economy, Fassin (2009) suggests that moral
economies rest at a “junction of problems” shaped by two different fields’ use of the
same term. In fields related to political-economy, moral economies relate to two levels of
analysis (Scott, 1977; Thompson, 1971). Firstly, moral economies referred to shifts
between forms of exchange to elucidate the moral aspects of material relations of pro-
duction and consumption in different historical contexts (Thompson, 1971). Building on
this approach, the term was used to refer to systems of norms, obligations, and expec-
tations that shape the evaluative aspects of material life, such as a sense of injustice in
the face of inequality (Scott, 1977). Fassin notes that in contrast to this political-
economic discussion of justice and outrage, the field of science and technology stud-
ies (STS) has used the term “moral economy” to refer to the distribution and connection
between sets of moral judgements. In this sense, moral economies referred to the
semiotic and discursive distribution of morals. The STS meaning of the term stems from
Daston’s reference to moral economies as a collective “web of affect-saturated values
that stand and function in well-defined relationship to one another” (Daston, 1995: 4)
within scientific circles. As Fassin (2009) summarises, the approach of Thompson and
Scott emphasises the economy and its moral consequences, while Daston focuses more
on morals and their economy-like circulation. Fassin attempts to smooth over dis-
junctures between the two field’s approaches to moral economies by suggesting that it is
constituted by a double topography, where on one level the economic distribution of
food conveys moralities while on another level the distribution of morals also has
economy-like properties. I see the distinction between product (chanpin/shipin) and
cuisine (cai/liaoli) among young Chinese people in Japan and broader Japanese
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discourse as reminiscent of Fassin’s double topography. Indeed, my interlocutors’
comments above suggest that in as much as scholarly discussions of moral economies
are subject to a double topography, everyday businessmen also discuss food with
attention to their economies, moralities and the contradictions they produce. Most moral
economies research relies on this kind of data, whether as media texts, figures, con-
versations or ethnographic observations. For example, Thompson (1971) relied on his-
torical documents and media texts, and Scott (1977) combined these with other
ethnographic methods. Given the semiotic qualities of this data, I argue that starting from
an exploration of food metonyms and metaphors helps us understand the double topo-
graphy of the moral economies of food more generally.
As Jakobson (1956) originally noted, the poles of metaphor and metonymy are an
important starting point in understanding systems of meaning because they are a com-
mon way of signifying the relationship between differing signs. Under Jakobson’s dis-
tinction between the two terms, metaphors rely on substitution and similarity, whereas
metonyms are contiguous with other phenomena. The metaphoric is associated with a
greater degree of play and flexibility, whereas metonyms tend towards reality-affirming
statements about the association between phenomena. While both processes are related
to how we imagine the relationship between things in the world, Jakobson notes,
metaphor is to poetry as metonymy is to prose, with an inevitable degree of tension
between these two modes of imagination. The tension between the metonymic and
metaphoric has been discussed by Sneath who, in examining how objects and divinatory
procedures invoke forms of imagination, defines metonymy as “when one item stands
for some other article of thought” (Sneath, 2009: 78). In Sneath’s exploration of tech-
nology and magic in Mongolia for example, electric light is metonymic for modernity in
Mongolia. In a similar way, O’Shea (2015) has argued that food mobilities are symbolic
of modernity in the Sino-Japanese context. In particular, he argues that the geopolitics of
food show how the intersection between discourses of risk and food produce a state of
anxiety where “modernity mitigates traditional risks while simultaneously creating new,
man-made ones” (O’Shea, 2015: 304). This state of anxiety, much like Thompson’s
account of concerns over unequal food access in eighteenth century Britain, show how
the perceived morality of food economies takes on new geopolitical meanings in an era
of increased transnational food dependency. Given these tendencies, I argue that
industrialised food economies posit food produce as a metonym for modernity. This
metonymic association is because of the close connection between modernity and its
promise of mitigating risk (Beck, 1992), which is a major concern in Sino-Japanese
moral economies of food (Walravens, 2017).
Discourse about Chinese Cuisine
The Chinese food mentioned in the Japanese media discourses and observations above
largely refers to Chinese “produce” (食品, shokuhin), but among the young Chinese
people I spoke to, discussions of Chinese “cuisine” as either cai (菜) in Chinese, or ryōri/
liaoli (料理) as a code-switched term between Japanese and Chinese, affords divergent
ways of imagining the moralities of food. As Farrer argues “cuisine is a type of
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discourse, a way of labelling and organizing the various bodily pleasures and sensations
associated with food consumption and food preparation” (Farrer, 2015: 4). While dis-
cussions of manufactured products, from crabs and frozen dumplings relate to questions
of production and modernity, food-talk about “cuisine” focuses more on questions of
consumption and the combination of different products (i.e. preparation). This different
focus means that cuisine-related “food-talk” often relates more directly to ethno-cultural
ideas of identity, bodily experience and taste. The question of cuisine, as Takeda (2008)
has shown in the case of Japan, often has significant political implications. In the case of
Japan, Japanese cuisine has been a major biopolitical project where the bodies of citi-
zens, cultivated through particular kinds of cuisine, are represented as embodying the
nation as a whole (Cwiertka, 2006; Niehaus and Walravens, 2017; Takeda, 2008).
Representationally speaking then, cuisine has often been the domain of discourse and
practices where “the nation” is re-scaled and translated to an individual level. Within
contexts such as Ikebukuro, where migrants form local Sino-Japanese relations, the
sensory qualities of food, and the modes in which food is prepared, were often connected
to the affective and moral qualities of an imagined Chinese or Japanese subject. In this
sense, while the safety and quality of produce signified moral qualities associated with
modernity and trustworthiness, the subject of “cuisine” was often framed in terms of
“personality” (性格, xingge), affect, and authenticity.
The popularity of Ikebukuro as a hub of Chinese sociality was in many ways pre-
mised on distinctions made between Japanese and Chinese tastes and their associated
cuisines. My interlocutors were predominantly from China’s north with additional rep-
resentatives from Shanghai, Chengdu, Fuzhou, and Hainan. Addicted to Chilli and
strong spices such as Sichuanese pepper, they embraced a broadly omnivorous approach
to Chinese cuisine. Ikebukuro’s western quarter is home to a variety of foods, from
Mongolian stuffed flatbreads roubing (肉饼) to malatang (麻辣烫), Xinjiang lamb
kebabs and a hotpot chain from the mainland called Haidilao (海底捞). There are also
several barbecue restaurants, such as one named Dongfanghong (东方红), which
parodies cultural revolution aesthetics in its décor, while serving up large hunks of meat
that you grill yourself. Many of these flavours mirrored those you would find in major
cities in China, making Ikebukuro seem different to other well-known “Chinatowns” in
Japan such as Yokohama. According to the “food-talk” of my interlocutors, Ikebukuro
was a place for Chinese consumers rather than Japanese tourists, although this narrative
obfuscates the complicated migratory histories of these differing areas. According to
many of the Chinese people I spoke to in Tokyo, Yokohama has a long-standing
association with groups of Chinese-speaking people who remained in Japan after
1949. In contrast, Ikebukuro’s western area is more associated with mainlanders who
migrated after 1985 (Tajima, 2003), whose tastes and perceptions of Chinese cuisine
align with the post-socialist largess of reform era appetites (Farquhar, 2002; Osburg,
2013)
Among my interlocutors, the variety of Chinese cuisine available in Ikebukuro was
often contrasted with Japan’s adaptations of Chinese cuisine, called chūka ryōri (中華料
理). As Farrer (2018) notes, chūka ryōri restaurants are statistically the most popular
restaurants in Japanese neighbourhoods, with over 55,000 counted in 2014. Yet, most
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chūka ryōri restaurants today are not owned or staffed by Chinese people. Many
favourites typical of everyday Japanese diets today, such as noode soups (ラーメン,
ramen and pan-fried gyoza are seen as having Chinese origins, although they have a long
and complicated history in Japan (Kushner, 2012). In particular, after Japan’s wartime
expansion into East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century, and a subsequent
cultural shift in the post-war era, dishes such as ramen, gyoza and other dishes became
extremely popular. These dishes are not necessarily seen as Chinese by many Japanese
consumers but are ambiguous in their “Japaneseness” and are often seen as somewhat
“Chinese.” As Kushner (2011) notes, every part of Japan has its own story about how
ramen became popular. For example, in Yokohama migrant businesses such as Rair-
aiken, are said to have popularised ramen. Similarly, it is often rumoured that Japanese
returnees from China in the post-war era brought different kinds of chūka ryōri with
them. During Japan’s colonisation of Korea and Northern China, many Japanese people
were encouraged to immigrate and settle in territories occupied by Japan’s imperial
regime, such as Manchuria, other parts of northern China and Taiwan. One of the stories
around ramen’s popularity in post-war era argues that after Japan was defeated in the
Asia-Pacific war in 1945, these settlers were repatriated to Japan bringing new cuisines
with them. Kushner doubts the validity of this story and argues that this tale is likely to
be only one small factor in a much wider trend for rich, convenient street foods in
Japan’s post-war period. Nonetheless, this story about the rise of chūka ryōri is common
among both many Japanese and Chinese people I have spoken to. Regardless of its
origin stories, during Japan’s boom years, the chūka ryōri market became a common
business for working class and rural-to-urban migrants in Japan. As Aoyama (2003)
notes however, the post-war boom in chūka ryōri inspired a generation of Japanese
readers and budding chefs to see a love of food such as chūka ryōri as masculine and
egalitarian. Consequently, chūka ryōri became an important form of “Class B gourmet,”
a household comfort food, and a staple of working men’s drinking culture in Japan. As a
consequence however, chūka ryōri today is often seen as cheap and unrefined, although
there are notable exceptions within Tokyo’s amazing array of gourmet restaurants.
As Farrer (2017) has noted in his research on the reception of Japanese food in
Shanghai, Chinese consumers increasingly value and debate the authenticity of food. In
particular, the popularity of photographing, reviewing, and posting about food through
platforms such as WeChat has seen global cities such as Shanghai become a major hub in
a transnational Japanese culinary field. As Farrer notes, many of these restaurants rely on
seafood imports from places such as Nagasaki and further afield, not only because they
distrust local providers but also because it enhances the perceived authenticity of the
dishes prepared. For elite Chinese diners, an appreciation of “authentic” cuisine is one
among many performances of cultural capital. The under 45 years old I spoke to living in
Japan had a similar appreciation of Japan’s emphasis on the authenticity of its cuisine.
Yet, much like my informant’s indignation over the discrepancy between representations
of the Aqli Foods case and the poison dumpling incident, “food-talk” about the per-
ceived acceptance of “inauthentic” Chinese cuisine, or in other words chūka ryōri, were
contrasted with the right to authenticity in discussions of Japanese cuisine.
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The majority of the young Chinese people I spoke to in Ikebukuro were vaguely
aware of the history of chūka ryōri but would often simplify the narrative to one where
chūka ryōri was a poor copy of Chinese cuisine. They would joke about how Japan
“forgot” the Chinese origins of dishes such as ramen and gyoza, transforming or
inventing other dishes that were “bland” and inauthentic. As one young man said to me
while drinking in a local tapas-style bar called an izakaya:
Like so many things here (in Japan) that originally came from China, they (Japanese) don’t
want to admit that they borrowed so much. All the little restaurants sell gyoza. Is that not
Chinese? And why’d they have to make them so tasteless! (Anonymous 3, 2015)
As this testimony suggests, many young Chinese people demonstrated a combination of
indignation and bemusement about the role ofChinese cuisine in everyday Japanese life. This
perspectivemeant that chūka ryōriwas typically discussed in dismissive tones. For example,
the most ridiculed dish among those I spoke to was “Tianjin rice” (天津飯, Tianjin fan, or
tenshin han in Japanese), a seafood omelette spread over rice and then drowned in a gloopy
cornflour soup. The dish has no direct connection to Tianjin, and in the eyes of my inter-
locutors, little appeal to young Chinese appetites. As a woman in her thirties from Shijiaz-
huang once said to me “it looks like someone vomited in a bowl” (Anonymous 4, 2016).
The youngChinese people I spoke to often connected othermoral and affective qualities
to the perceived deficiencies of chūka ryōri and the generallymilder approach to flavours in
Japanese life. In particular, complaints about the bland and subtle qualities (清单, qingdan)
of Japanese food were speculatively linked to ideas that Japanese social life was somehow
timid and/or cold. Contrasted with the spicy, varied, and hot qualities of Ikebukuro’s var-
ious foods, discussions about “authentic” (真正, zhenzheng) Chinese cuisine would focus
on the “warm sentiment” (热情, reqing) embodied in its powerful flavours, or something
that was interesting or “hadmeaning” (有意思, you yisi). Even among those who had lived
in Japan for a while and had come to appreciate the understated flavours common in
Japanese cuisine, there was still a sense that these “cuisines” reflected something of the
“personality” of each nation. A man in his mid-thirties from Suzhou who worked as an
events organiser for fashionable international companies such as Chandon once com-
mented on this while we walked to pick up several boxes of pan-fried steamed buns from a
store near the Northern gate of Ikebukuro (Anonymous 5, 2015). He explained that he had
come to appreciate Japanese foods, particularly raw dishes, for their subtle qualities and
even joked that it is much easier to appear refined while eating. “I would not usually take a
client to a zhenzheng Chinese restaurant” he said, describing how it is too risky to subject
Japanese clients to strong flavours. Also, he added, he found it easier to keep his weight
down by eating Japanese food more regularly. “But” he continued “when I want to treat a
friend to a meal, or communicate that I want to be friends with someone, I will usually take
them for Chinese. It is comparatively more reqing.”
Contrasting Product and Cuisine
Within the Chinese-speaking world, Japan has often been posited as the most proximate
“alternative modernity” within East Asia (Iwabuchi, 2004). This perception among
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Chinese people has ensured that Japanese products, from food to fashion brands, are
generally praised as trustworthy, often in contrast to Chinese products. Much like my
informant who discussed the quality of seafood in China and Japan, many people would
present Chinese dishes as best when not prepared with Chinese produce. The preference
for non-Chinese “produce” I observed in Ikebukuro was not simply signposted by
Japanese businesses but was adopted by a variety of establishments concerned about safe
food. For instance, a popular meat-stuffed Mongolian flatbread shop run by a middle-
aged couple were proud of the fact that in producing a “cuisine” dubbed highly
authentic they could use imported lamb and beef from Australia, displaying a sign near
the small kitchen they had at the front of the shop. Although they said the best flavours
came from stronger flavoured inner-Mongolian mutton, they were happy to allay their
customers concerns by using imports from “trusted” places. Instances such as these
suggest that the metonymic qualities of “produce” in the global food economy pre-
dicate trust in countries more closely associated with modern food industries.
As a metonym for civilisation and modernity, discussions of the quality of produce in
China and Japan among my interlocutors would often reveal sticky associations between
national perceptions of produce, and the qualities of Japanese and Chinese personhood.
As one young man from Nanjing said to me while staring into a nice glass of Japanese
whiskey and reflecting on the differences between China’s alcohol industry and that in
Japan, “if the people who make the alcohol’s quality (素质, suzhi) is low, of course their
produce (chanpin) will be low quality” (Anonymous 6, 2010). This mode of framing
personhood in terms of “quality” has been a well-recognised aspect of popular and
governmental rhetoric in China over the past thirty years (Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis,
2007). The logics of suzhi also often adhere to the local, such as in Jacka’s work where
the “quality” of migrant workers in China is questioned because of the places they were
raised (Jacka, 2009). Applying similar logics to the Japanese context, widespread rec-
ognition of the high quality of Japan’s produce among my interlocutors were often
connected to Japan’s population, suggesting that purity of food and behaviour were the
product of, and the reason for, Japan’s civilised (文明, wenming) quality of life. For
example, in the blog entry “When you see this [you’ll realise] Japanese people are truly
terrifying!” (这么看来日本人真的非常可怕, zheme kanlai ribenren zhende feichang
kepa) the author provides a litany of ways Japan is clean, safe, and ordered, a large part
of which centred around the high suzhi of Japanese human resources (人才, rencai).
Many of the people I worked with also embodied these sentiments in their own
consumption practices. Every time one of my close informants went home to China for
example, the first thing she would crave on return to Japan was fresh seafood, arguing
that she did not dare to eat anything raw or fresh while in Shenyang (Anonymous 7,
2016). It would be inaccurate however to equate discussions around produce as simply
“Japan = good” and “China = bad.” Rather, it was the promise of a neutral, risk adverse
modernity that my interlocutors valued. Japan often embodied that modernity, but at
times contradictions in discourses and practices surrounding food production provided
opportunities to reflect upon their perceptions of Japan.
More often than not, young Chinese discussions of food were peppered with playful
critique rather than outright complaints. For example, a group of young entrepreneurs
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who had lived in Japan for 10 to 15 years had aspirations of furthering their businesses
into the field of media production, and as a Chinese-speaking Australian they would
occasionally ask me to join their short film productions. A group of them had started
posting films about life in Japan on Bilibili.com, focusing particularly on food in Japan.
During the heat of summer, they filmed a party where they would try a very expensive
square watermelon they had bought for around USD 200. They filmed a sketch where
the price tags of various Japanese products were counted in “I fucks” (卧槽, wocao)
rather than currency. One bottle of wine was one wocao, champagne was two wocaos and
the watermelon was countless wocaos. After filming the sketch, they proceeded to cut the
watermelon open revealing a pale yellow flesh that was relatively tasteless. Turning to the
camera one of the young men then said: “This watermelon is like Japan. Everything is
beautiful, and expensive, but it has no flavour. How boring!” (Anonymous 8, 2015).
Humorous discussions of food were the most common and applied to both jokes
about cuisine and produce, however on occasion discussions of produce and its relia-
bility also afforded more critical comparisons between life in China and Japan. The
hypocrisy of Japanese media representations of Chinese produce occasionally brewed
suspicions that Japan’s modernity did not guarantee any more safety than China. For
example, although based on hearsay, many of the young people I spoke to suspected that
the cheap “all you can drink” (飲み放題, nomihōdai) deals that many Japanese estab-
lishments offered sold fake alcohol. More seriously, since the 3/11 Great East Japan
Earthquake Disaster (東日本大震災, Higashi nihon daishinsai) and subsequent
Fukushima nuclear meltdown in 2011, significant anxieties and media panics occurred
surrounding suspected radioactive contamination in foods from Eastern Japan (Kleeman,
2018). After a few Chinese-language news reports sparked concerns about food and
water from Fukushima (Wang, 2013), there were online debates among users of a
Chinese-language media service called XiaochunWang about where it was safe to buy
vegetables (XiaochunWang, 2013). Different areas close to Tokyo were compared, with
Saitama deemed the safest cheap option and online importing from Kyushu as the most
expensive. As Farrer (2017) noted in relation to the 3/11 disaster’s effect on the field of
Japanese cuisine in Shanghai, despite an immediate panic about Japanese food safety
concerns about radiation in food were short lived in China. Similarly, despite debates
online, few of the people I spoke to in Ikebukuro seemed particularly concerned about
radiation, seeing the capacity to deal with food system problems as ostensibly being a
question of development. As a young woman from Liaoning stated in a follow-up
comment online after I wrote to some of my former contacts while preparing this arti-
cle “Japan’s problems still pale in comparison to China’s, because China is still too
chaotic (乱, luan) to be able to solve its problems. Imagine if this had happened in
China? Good heavens!” (Anonymous 9, 2018).
Conclusion
Within this article, I contrasted two different ways food embodies moral imaginaries in
the Sino-Japanese context from the perspective of Chinese people under the age of 45
in Japan. I discussed how moral imaginaries emerge when the movement of “products”
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in the Sino-Japanese context create anxieties about food mobilities, the promises of
modernity, perceptions of risk, and the media portrayal of Chinese food safety. The
friction (Tsing, 2005) caused by these anxieties place young Chinese people in Japan in
the awkward position of often agreeing with the criticisms of Chinese produce while also
being particularly sensitive to contradictions within discourses about Chinese food.
Discussions of Chinese food as “cuisine” in the Sino-Japanese context often ameliorated
the negative connotations of Chineseness, as did playful discussions of food in Japan
more generally. The metaphoric, recombinant, and mutable qualities of cuisine allowed
my interlocutors to frame their experiences of food in ways that connected personal and
ethnic identities to a moral economy more focused on “affect-laden values” (Daston,
1995) of cosmopolitan-consumerism and authenticity rather than concerns about safety
and trustworthiness. Distinctions between cuisines were matters of national and regional
pride, connecting affective and sensory experiences of food, such as boredom, distaste,
or even disgust (Durham, 2011), to everyday theories about the personality of particular
cultures and ethnicities. Yet, these differences were posited in ways that were typically
relativistic or humorous. You could learn to appreciate a cuisine over time, or at least
respect its difference, and in the process of learning about these differences there were
many jokes to be made.
The disjuncture between different framings of food in the Sino-Japanese context in
many senses mirrors Fassin’s (2009) observation that moral economies research is
subject to a “double topography” where some researchers focus on the economy of
moralities, or in other words their distribution, while others focus on the morality of
economies, or in other words whether an economic system is moral. My argument is that
everyday people, much like researchers, also contend with this double topography in the
way they discuss food in both media and social settings. Caught at a “junction of
problems” reminiscent of scholarly discourse about moral economies, young Chinese
people found themselves navigating multiple domains of food-talk that focused on either
food production and safety, or cuisine, authenticity, and ethno-nationalist ideas of sen-
timent. Concerns about the quality and safety of produce seemed to hit a nerve in ways
that cuisine did not however, spurring reflections about China’s place in the world and
occasional frustrations about unequal treatment in Japanese discourse.
These ethnography-based reflections suggest that more semiotic attention needs to be
paid to how the moralities of moral economies are framed. As one possible approach, I
have shown how looking for metaphors and metonyms allows the researcher to compare
different kinds of morally oriented “food-talk.” Metonymically, Chinese products rep-
resent the extent to which China is seen as modern in young Chinese food-talk. In
contrast, Chinese cuisine serves as a metaphor for perceptions that Chinese culture is
“warmer” and better at promoting “human feeling.” While much has been discussed in
relation to modernity and the geopolitics of food safety in the Sino-Japanese context
(O’Shea, 2015; Walravens, 2017), and the geopolitics of cuisine (Farrer, 2017), there is
still considerable need for theoretical approaches that try to address these differing
domains of discourse and practice. As Oxfeld states “food powerfully communicates and
fulfills moral obligations and is also a potent symbol that is used to judge morality in
others” (Oxfeld, 2014: 63). Considering this communicative power, the terms and
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frameworks for moral economies of food warrant further attention. Given the plural and
conflictual nature of moral imaginaries, such as those presented by young Chinese
engagements with food related discourse in Japan, it is worth questioning how we define
the boundaries and topography of moral economies. Do we occupy single moral
economies or are we constantly moving between different fields of moral contestation?
As Zigon (2007) argues, points where moral orders appear to no longer work are often
the best places to uncover the inner workings of morality in a specific context. Exploring
the tensions, slippages, and moments of hypocrisy found within the fields of food dis-
course is thus a useful way to trace the contours of Chinese moral economies of food in
transnational contexts such as Japan.
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